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Comments
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Current Status and
Applicability of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition
Under the Pennsylvania Criminal Justice System
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Go not in and out in the courts of justice so that thy name may
not stink."' That comment by an ancient Egyptian philosopher
captures some of the present day askance with which our criminal
justice system is sometimes viewed by those who come into contact
with the system and those who view it with a more critical eye.
Further, besides the stigma associated with a conviction or perhaps
even of being so much as the target of law enforcement officials in
some manner, punishment has traditionally appeared to be the primary focus of the criminal justice system. However, it has modernly been the case that rehabilitation goes side by side with punishment as a goal of the criminal justice system.2
As part of, or perhaps in response to the rehabilitative goal,
there has emerged an attempt by the legislature, courts and prosecutors to remove certain "eligible" defendants from the traditional
criminal justice process and divert them into what has now come
to be commonly known as pre-trial intervention or diversion (hereafter diversion). Diversion has been most accurately defined as the
practice of withholding criminal prosecution or incarceration in
favor of some rehabilitative and/or restitutional activity.' Further,
the goal of diversion programs has been specifically articulated as
correctional reform and social restoration of offenders." Apart from
1.
2.

A. ERMAN, THE LITERATURE OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS (A. Blackman trans. 1927).
Note, JudicialControl of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Pre-trialDiversion Programs,
31 BUFFALO L.R. 909 (1982); see also Alford, Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition: The
Newest Facet of the Criminal Justice System (The Allegheny County Program), 13 DuQ. L.
REV. 499 (1975).
3. R. NIMMER, THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION, 3 (1974).
4.

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COR-

RECTIONS

77 (1973).
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this rehabilitative goal, however, diversion has the related but distinct and concrete purpose of serving to ease the burdenous
caseloads of trial courts by allowing the courts to concentrate on,
and give more considered attention to, more serious criminal cases.
Pennsylvania's diversion program is known as Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) and is embodied in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.,
That diversion in Pennsylvania serves to ease the trial courts' burden is beyond dispute. For example, in 1984 in Allegheny County
alone, 3,476 individual cases were disposed of through the ARD
program.6 That figure takes on particular significance in the context of the other dispositions made by that same criminal court
division; except for guilty pleas (5,912), the number of cases disposed by ARD exceeded dispositions by non-jury trials (2,387) jury
trials (455), and nolle prosse (1,058).1 Thus, diversion through the
ARD program presently comprises approximately 38% of the total
cases disposed of by the criminal courts in Allegheny County. The
benefits of its implementation and operation in terms of reducing
the trial workload of the criminal courts cannot be denied.'
However, despite the success of ARD in clearing trial calendar
and the low rate of recidivism for persons placed on ARD9 the program has spawned certain problems. In connection with this consideration, this comment will discuss the legislative and judicial
history of ARD and whether the judicial interpretations properly
apply the legislative intent.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ACCELERATED REHABILITATIVE

DISPOSITION

The beginnings of the ARD program in Pennsylvania can be
traced to a Pre-Indictment Probation program instituted, with approval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Philadelphia County
in 1971.10 As then envisioned, that program comported with the
5.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85.

6.

1984 ANNUAL REPORT 7, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYL-

VANIA, CRIMINAL DIVISION, Robert E. Dauer, Administrative Judge, Criminal Division.
7. Id. Appendix.
8. Administrative Judge Dauer was effusive in his praise of the ARD program. "The
superb success of the ARD program is largely due to screening, interrogation and investigation of the fine staff of the ARD section of the District Attorney's Office ....
Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Specter, Diversion of Persons from the Criminal Process to Treatment Alternatives, 44 PA. B.A.Q. 690 (1973). The author is presently the junior senator from
Pennsylvania.

1985

ARD

general philosophical, as well as tangential, goals of diversion as it
then existed in the United States. The Philadelphia program was
designed for first offenders charged with non-violent crimes, with
the hope of channelling those persons into a rehabilitative treatment modality before they fell into a pattern of criminal activity."
Perhaps of equal import with the goal of rehabilitation was the
express desire to relieve court congestion by permitting diversion
12
of "non-hardened" defendants from the trial calendar.
The success of that program apparently led the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to consider and subsequently enact, by order of
May 24, 1972, the currently operative ARD program. 13 The Rules
are accompanied by comments authored by the Supreme Court
Criminal Procedural Rules Committee 4 (hereafter Rules Committee), wherein is noted the dual focus of the program: the elimination, in minor cases, of lengthy motions and trials, and the elimination of other court proceedings where the defendant suffers more
from behavioral or social problems rather than criminality per se.1 5
Likewise, the comments indicate that the rehabilitative emphasis
of the program and the desire for prompt disposition of charges led
to the title "accelerated rehabilitative disposition. ' ' Is
Similarly, the Comment notes that the Rules do not specify
those classes of offenses or offenders which are eligible or ineligible
for inclusion in the ARD program.' 7 As envisioned and operated,
the Philadelphia program excluded all crimes of violence, and pri11. Id. at 692.
12. Id. The author notes that "[tihe program was designed... [to] free court time for
the trial of repeaters and violent criminals." Id. Continuing, the author states:
The District Attorney's office employs a full-time assistant district attorney and
supporting paralegal and clerical personnel to screen all cases initiated by arrest to
determine appropriateness for the ARD Program. Exceptional cases and requests by
defense counsel for reconsideration are specially reviewed by the chief of the ARD
Unit. Upon being accepted, both the defendant and the complainant are advised of
participation in the program by letter. If the terms of the program are agreeable to
both, the case is listed for an ARD hearing before [the] judge ...
Id.
13. PA. R. CRIM. P. 185, Comment. The comment states, inter alia, that "Rules 175
through 185, inclusive are based upon the presently existing practice in Philadelphia County
where a program of pre-indictment accelerated rehabilitative disposition exists under an
order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entered January 6, 1971." Id.
14. The Committee is an appointed body comprised of members of the trial bench,
defense bar and prosecution. Criminal Procedural Rules Committee, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, Law Center, 1919 N. Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19122.
15. PA. R. CRIM. P. 185, comment. See infra note 27.
16. Id. In light of those considerations, the Committee declined to adopt, as the title
of the program, "pre-indictment probation" or "deferred disposition." Id.
17. Id.
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marily accepted minor property crimes and small scale narcotics
offenses; however, the commentators indicated that the promulgated Rules contemplated wide prosecutorial discretion.'
Indeed, the only specific and express limitation on the prosecutor's discretion arose under the 1982 Pennsylvania drunk driving
law. 9 Therein the prosecuting attorney is prohibited from submitting a charge for ARD if the defendant has within the previous
seven years been adjudged guilty of or participated in ARD for the
infraction of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance; has violated any specific offense pursuant to the revocation of a habitual offender's license;20 or, has, in connection with
the present offense, killed or maimed a third person.2 '
Beyond this relatively recent limitation, however, the parameters
of the prosecutor's discretion have not, at either the time of the
1972 origin or until more recently been the subject of an articu18. Id. As the Committee indicated, "no attempt has been made in these Rules to
specify what cases or classes of cases should be eligible for inclusion in the program. It is
believed that the district attorney should have discretion with respect to which crimes he
wishes to prosecute ....
" Id.
19. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon 1977)(Supp. 1985).
20. Id. at (d)(2). 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1542 (Purdon 1977) provides:
§ 1542. Revocation of habitual offender's license.(a) General rule. - The department shall revoke the operating privilege of any person found to be a habitual offender pursuant to the provisions of this section. A "habitual offender" shall be any
person whose driving record, as maintained in the department, shows that such person has accumulated the requisite number of convictions for the separate and distinct
offenses described and enumerated in subsection (b) committed after the effective
date of this title and within any period of five years thereafter.(b) Offenses enumerated. - Three convictions arising from separate acts of any one or more of the following offenses committed either singularly or In combination by any person shall
result in such person being designated as a habitual offender:
(1) Any offense set forth in section 1523 (relating to revocation or suspension
of operating privilege).(2) Operation following suspension of registration as defined in section 1371 (relating to operation following suspension of registration).(3) Making use of or operating any vehicle without the knowledge or consent of the owner or custodian thereof.(4) Utilizing a vehicle in the unlawful
transportation or unlawful sale of alcohol or any controlled substance.(5) Any
felony in the commission of which a court determines that a vehicle was essentially involved.(c) Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition as an offense. - Acceptance of Accelerative Rehabilitative Disposition for any offense enumerated
in subsection (b) shall be considered an offense for the purposes of this section.
(d) Period of revocation. - The operating privilege of any person found to
be a habitual offender under the provisions of this section shall be revoked by
the department for a period of five years.
(e) Additional offenses. - Any additional offense committed within a period
of five years shall result in a revocation for an additional period of two years.
Id. 1976, June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81, § 1 eff. July 1, 1977 (footnote omitted).
21. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon 1977)(Supp. 1985).
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lated proscription by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or legislature. However, in response to an increasing amount of controversy
at the trial level,, the Rules Committee published recommended
changes to the ARD Rules and in regard to prosecutorial discretion
recommended that an introduction to the Rules be added which
would, in part, clearly state that it is the district attorney, as part
of his or her charging function, who is to determine which cases
will be recommended for entry into the ARD program.2 2 Owing at
least in part to correspondence voicing the opinion that the lack of
uniform statewide standards was causing confusion, the Rules
Committee reaffirmed the prosecutorial discretion in this area.
"Although the Committee has several times considered the matter
at length, ultimately, a majority of the Committee remains of the
view that designating eligibility or ineligibility for pre-trial diversion is substantive and therefore beyond the court's rule-making
' 23
authority.
The issue of the district attorney's discretion arises from Rules
175 and 176, which provide that it is the district attorney, exclusively, who may move that the case be considered for ARD.2 4 Although the Rules specify that a defendant may request that the
district attorney move his case for ARD, nowhere do the Rules
provide that the defendant himself may request that the court
place him in the ARD program; nor do the Rules specify that the
court of its own volition, in the absence of prosecutorial initiative
or in the presence of prosecutorial opposition, may undertake to
place a defendant into the ARD program.2 5
22. 480 A.2d XLVIII, XLIX (1984). The Committee goes on to note the statutory exception discussed previously, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at LX.
24. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175. Rule 175 states:
After a defendant is held for court by an issuing authority, the attorney for the
Commonwealth, upon his own motion or upon request of the defendant's attorney,
may submit the transcript returned by the issuing authority to a judge empowered to
try cases on information or indictment and may move that the case be considered for
accelerated rehabilitative disposition.

Id.
Rule 176 states:
After an information or indictment, the attorney for the Commonwealth upon his
own motion or upon request of the defendant's attorney may submit the information
or indictment to a judge empowered to try cases on information or indictment, and
may move that the case be considered for accelerated rehabilitative disposition.
Id.
25. Id. Indeed, with respect to persons charged with drunk driving, the Superior Court
has stated that a defendant has no right to demand acceptance into an accelerated rehabilitative disposition, and that Rules 175-85 make such acceptance contingent upon the prose-
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Thus, the situation may be partially summarized as absent a
very narrow area of legislative prescription,"0 the prosecutor, theoretically at least, has unfettered discretion in choosing what person
or what classes of offenses will be eligible for the ARD program. As
a result, moreover, as will be subsequently discussed, an offense
qualifying in one county for ARD disposition may not qualify in
another county; and the defendant, if rejected by reason of the
type of offense he committed, or for any other independent reason,
is left with the choice of: (1) proceeding to a guilt determination
phase; (2) pleading guilty with the hope of receiving the most lenient sentence available under Pennsylvania sentencing law; (3) requesting that the court direct that the district attorney move for
his admission into the ARD program; or, (4) requesting that the
court itself, in the face of prosecutorial inaction or opposition,
place the defendant into the ARD program.
With respect to this latter statement, it should be noted that the
original comment accompanying the 1972 enactment of rules implementing ARD, in addition to broadly defining the discretion
given the district attorney, stated that "the presence of the judge
in the program, along with the defendant and his attorney, precludes any danger that such discretion may be abused. ' 2 7 Nevertheless, despite the existence of such a safeguard, it is clear from
the cases considered by the Pennsylvania appellate courts that
since its inception in 1972, the ARD program has spawned a host
of problems owing in large part to the broad existence and exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. This article will survey those cases that
reflect most poignantly the problems that have arisen, been considered, and in some part remain unresolved despite a clear trend to
reaffirm and even enlarge prosecutorial discretion in this area.
cution's motion therefore. Commonwealth v. Boerner, 268 Pa. Super. 168, 407 A.2d 883
(1979), appeal dismissed, 491 Pa. 416, 421 A.2d 206 (1980). See also infra note 172 and
accompanying text.
26.

See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text; 480 A.2d at XLIX-L.

27. PA. R. CRIM. P. 185, comment. Continuing, the official comment, discussing the
experience of Philadelphia County with ARD, notes: It has been the practice of the district
attorney of Philadelphia County to notify the victim, if any, that he may be heard in person
or by letter. This principle has been incorporated in Rules 177, 178, and 179, which also
provide for notice in writing to any victim of when a hearing is to be held on a motion to
admit a defendant to A.R.D. This provision further helps to guarantee against any abuse of
discretion by the district attorney.
Id.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ACCELERATED REHABILITATIVE
DISPOSITION

Any point of inquiry into the judicial interpretation of ARD
must begin with Commonwealth v. Kindness,8 which serves as a
starting point both in terms of constitutional and pragmatical
problems regarding diversion.
In Kindness, the defendant, after his arraignment on charges of
driving under the influence of alcohol 29 (heieafter DUI), filed a
motion with the court requesting consideration for ARD.30 Pursuant to the court's direction, the Commonwealth's answer alleged
that the recommendation of a case for ARD consideration was discretionary on the part of the district attorney, and that therefore,
it need not be submitted.31 On appeal, Kindness asserted that
prosecutorial consent, as a prerequisite to ARD admission, was unconstitutional in that such a prerequisite would necessarily involve
an improper delegation of a judicial function 32
Writing for the majority, Judge Cercone3" first stated that regardless of a prosecutor's decision not to approve a particular case
for ARD, no delegation of sentencing power occurred because the
court could ultimately place the defendant on probation even in
28. 247 Pa. Super. 99, 371 A.2d 1346 (1977).
29. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon 1977). Section 3731, in parts pertinent to
the present discussion, states:(a) Offense defined - A person shall not drive, operate or be
in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe
driving;
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any controlled substance to a degree
which renders the person incapable of safe driving; or
(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or greater.
Id.
30. 247 Pa. Super. at 103, 371 A.2d at 1347.
31. Id., 371 A.2d at 1348. Moreover, the district attorney, in support of his discretion,
indicated that, in light of the Dauphin County Court's request that DUI offenses not be
considered for ARD treatment and his personal belief that the public, burdened with the
problem of drunk drivers, would be ill served by submitting such cases to ARD, he would
not submit the instant case for ARD consideration. Id.
The lower court, agreeing with the Commonwealth, denied the motion, and set the case
for trial. The appellant was found guilty, fined $300, and placed on probation for one year.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Judge Cercone was joined by President Judge Watkins and Judges Jacobs, Price
and Van der Voort. Id. at 102, 371 A.2d at 1347. Judge Hoffman concurred with the analysis
advanced by the majority but stated that the appellant had not properly preserved the issue
for appeal. Id. at 111, 371 A.2d at 1352. Judge Spaeth filed a concurring and dissenting
opinion. Id. See infra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
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the event of a guilty verdict or guilty plea."'
The Kindness court also rejected a separation of powers argument that appellant Kindness had based on California case law.
The appellant argued that the decision to divert a defendant into a
rehabilitation program is an exercise of a judicial power and could
not constitutionally be subordinated to the veto of a prosecutor.3 5
The Kindness court noted, however, that the power of a California
court to divert was granted by the legislature in the state penal
code,"0 and that the diversion power vested in the California courts
stemmed, as the California courts acknowledged, "from the historical powers of nolle prosequi which were traditionally vested in the
Attorney General of England and in the prosecuting attorneys in
' '37
the American states.
The Kindness court then looked closely at where the power to
nolle prosequi lies in Pennsylvania. The superior court determined
that although the legislature stated that it was necessary that the
prosecutor obtain court approval to do so ss it was nevertheless
clearly the law of Pennsylvania that a nolle prosequi could only be
entered by the prosecuting officer, or with his consent.39 The court
then extended its support of prosecutorial discretion with regard to
criminal charges by stating that, aside from those instances where
it was necessary for the court to dismiss charges to vindicate a procedural right,' 0 the Pennsylvania courts do not have power to dismiss a prosecution unless the legislature expressly empowers it to
34. 247 Pa. Super. at 104, 371 A.2d at 1348. The court noted that such prosecutorial
discretion created "no interference with the judicial power to determine the mode of correction to which a particular defendant [would] be subjected." Id. Thus, the majority reasoned,
with the sentencing power firmly within the province of the court, no unconstitutional delegation of sentencing power occurred. Id.
35. Id. The appellant relied upon People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11
Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1975), wherein the California court stated:The
judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that
before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise.
Id. at 25, 520 P.2d at 409 (emphasis in original).
36. 247 Pa. Super. at 103, 371 A.2d at 1348 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West
1977)).
37. 247 Pa. Super. at 105, 371 A.2d at 1349 (quoting People v. Gonzales, 235 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 887, 890, 46 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1965)).
38. 247 Pa. Super. at 106, 371 A.2d at 1349 (citing 19 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 492
(Purdon 1964)).
39. 247 Pa. Super. at 106, 371 A.2d at 1349 (quoting Commonwealth v. Reed, 65 Pa.
Super. 91, 99 (1916)).
40. 247 Pa. Super. at 107, 371 A.2d at 1349. As an example, the court cited PA. R.
CRIM. P. 1100 (right to a speedy trial).
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do so.4'1
With that background, the court then considered the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's general authority to enact procedural rules
such as Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 175-85. 42 Judge
Cercone stated that the court's rule-making powers emanated
from, and were limited by, Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution which states that "[S]uch rules [must be] consistent
with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify,
the substantive rights of any litigant.

43

Judge Cercone indicated

that the court was limited in its rule- making by the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and could not, in the first instance, even create a diversion program without requiring
4
prosecutorial initiative. 4

The court then considered two equal protection claims advanced
by appellant Kindness. First, the court noted that Kindness had
been rejected pursuant to the district attorney's policy that denied
to all members of his class, drunk drivers, admission into the ARD
program.45 The court indicated that, in light of the life endangering threat created by drunk driving, the classification was neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, and thus rejected the argument that
ARD discriminated against intoxicated persons."
41. Kindness, 247 Pa. Super. at 107, 371 A.2d at 1349. The court enumerated those
legislatively defined areas: (1) where the aggrieved party has a civil remedy and satisfaction
has been made to that party (19 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 491 (Purdon 1964), PA. R. CRIM. P.
745; (2) where the court finds that the offense falls into a statutorily defined "de minimis"
category (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 312 (Purdon 1983)); (3) where the court finds that a
prosecution for conduct charged to constitute criminal attempt solicitation or conspiracy,
but determined to be so unlikely to.achieve its objective that the actor and his conduct may
be considered harmless (18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 905(b) (Purdon 1983)). 247 Pa. Super. at
107 n.5, 371 A.2d at 1349 n.5.
42. 247 Pa. Super. at 107, 371 A.2d at 1350.
43. Id., 371 A.2d at 1350 (quoting PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 7, 10(c)).
44. 247 Pa. Super. at 107, 371 A.2d at 1350. Specifically, the court held that:The supervisory powers of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are limited by Article V, § 10(c) of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which grants that Court its procedural rule-making powers but
qualifies that grant by stating: "[S]uch rules [must be] consistent with this constitution and
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." The Court was
thus limited to working within the existing framework of separation of powers, and therefore could not create a diversion program without requiring prosecutorial initiative, as the
Commonwealth is indisputably a litigant and possesses a substantive right to insist on seeking a conviction. It follows that this court cannot do so either. While there is something to
be said for allowing a court to overrule a prosecutor and order diversion, it should be said to
the General Assembly.
Id.
45. Id. at 108, 371 A.2d at 1350.
46. Id. The court specifically noted that the statute did not deal with intoxication per
se. Rather, it dealt with the activities of a person in an intoxicated position. By analogy, the
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The second aspect of Kindness' equal protection argument was
that the exclusion of drunken drivers from ARD in Dauphin
County, but not in other counties, was a violation of his constitutional rights, in that residence in a particular county was an unreasonable basis for classification.4 7 In response, the court intimated
that while uniformity within the state, for ARD admission, might
be preferable, such a requirement was not necessary for the statute
to be constitutionally sound.4 8
In support of this position, albeit in two instances somewhat
dated, Judge Cercone stated that the fourteenth amendment does
not unequivocally preclude diversities of law in different parts of
the same state;' 9 that the Constitution does not forbid the state
from using disparate methods for different counties; 50 and, that
only arbitrary decisions can be declared void under the fourteenth
amendment.5 1 Thus, the court concluded that both prosecutorial
discretion and differential treatment between counties, as embodied in the Pennsylvania ARD program, were constitutional.
Although he agreed with the disposition of this particular case,
now President Judge Spaeth resoundingly criticized the majority's
reasoning and its vote of confidence in the ARD rules as enacted. 2
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Spaeth addressed
many of the tender spots then present; problem areas that remain
largely unremedied as of this writing. In an exhaustive opinion,
Judge Spaeth first traced the history and development of the ARD
program, and indicated his firm belief in, and support of, diversion
generally. 53
court indicated that while an intoxicated driver would be equally as dangerous as a sober
burglar, an intoxicated driver is much more dangerous than a sober driver. Id.
47. Id. at 110, 371 A.2d at 1350.
48. Id. Indeed, the court noted that while "differences among counties in the treatment of particular types of offenders may breed resentment among the more harshly treated
defendants and may contribute to an image of the criminal justice system as one in which
decisions are made arbitrarily and inequitably [,J . . . not everything that is desirable is
constitutionally required." Id.
49. Id. at 109, 371 A.2d at 1351 (quoting Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879)).
50. 247 Pa. Super. at 110, 371 A.2d at 1351 (quoting Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F. Supp.
602, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
51. 247 Pa. Super. at 110-11, 371 A.2d at 1351 (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v.
Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913)). Specifically, the Metropolis Theatre Court held that:
"[t]o be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust
and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations." Id.
52. 247 Pa. Super. at 111-16, 371 A.2d at 1352-54 (Spaeth, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 116-17, 371 A.2d at 1354-55 (Spaeth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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Initially, Judge Spaeth took the majority to task for accepting
the premise that diversion is a species of prosecutorial discretion;
rather, as he believed, diversion is unmistakeably a judicial decision.5 4 Judge Spaeth conceded that the prosecutor has the discretion of arrest and charging, but he indicated that once a defendant
is held for court, the prosecution's discretion has been exercised.
"[T]he prosecutorial die has long since been cast" and consequent
disposition is at the court's discretion as part of its sentencing prerogative.5 5 Judge Spaeth, relying heavily on the diversion experience of California and New Jersey in demonstrating the judicial
nature of diversion, readily pointed out that the California Supreme Court had rejected as unconstitutional a statutory enactment that the decision to divert is an extension of the charging
process and thus within the prosecutor's discretion." Judge Spaeth
also found support in the Supreme Court of New Jersey which had
determined that "the decision not to divert a given case was 'judicially cognizable.' ,,57
Armed with the belief that he had established that diversion is a
form of sentencing and thus a judicial decision, Judge Spaeth
stated that the fundamental invalidity of the rules-an unconstitutional delegation to the district attorney of the exclusive judicial
responsibility of sentencing-was obvious. 8 Indeed, in his dissent,
part). It is interesting to note that while Judge Spaeth believed diversion to be both humane
and efficient, he was convinced that as presently structured, the Pennsylvania ARD program
was fundamentally invalid, carrying with it great dangers. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 118, 371 A.2d at 1355-56 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405,
113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974)).
56. 247 Pa. Super. at 120, 371 A.2d at 1357 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21
(1974)).
57. 247 Pa. Super. at 121, 371 A.2d at 1357 (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321, 334 (1976)). But see State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 376, 375 A.2d 607, 615 (1977). See also State v. Sutton, 668 S.W.2d 678
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Hammersly, 650 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Smith,
92 N.J. 143, 455 A.2d 1117 (1983); Cleveland v. State, 417 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1983); State v.
Collins, 90 N.J. 449, 434 A.2d 628 (1981); State v. Collier, 627 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982); State v. Dalgish, 86 N.J. 503, 432 A.2d 74 (1981); Blackwell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 832
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Dearborne v. State,
575 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. 1978).
58. 247 Pa. Super. at 122, 371 A.2d at 1357-58. Specifically, Judge Spaeth stated:
[U]nder the present rules the district attorney is given the absolute discretion to
decide whether a case shall or shall not be submitted to the court; he need not state
in advance what sort of cases he will consider to possible submission, nor what factors
in any given case will weigh for or against submission; nor need he state why he has
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Judge Spaeth became almost vehement in his attack, stating that
the Rules must fall because even the most principled district attorney had unfettered discretion; bounded by neither standards nor
constraints, criteria or procedure. 5 9
Judge Spaeth did not stop with his criticism of the majority
opinion and ARD as it then existed, but rather, to his credit, he
urged the supreme court to amend the ARD Rules to incorporate
requirements that in his opinion must be part of the ARD program
in order to assume constitutional integrity.6 0 Judge Spaeth then
pointed to four areas of concern, which to date have been left
unanswered.
The first suggested requirement was that there be promulgated a
definition of what sort of cases be eligible for diversion." Judge
Spaeth noted that pursuant to a New Jersey Supreme Court decision, defendants accused of any crime were eligible for diversion.2
It has been noted hereinabove that the Pennsylvania Rules Committee has recently rejected the notion of a uniform statewide
standard for eligible or ineligible offenses.6 3 The wisdom of the
Rules Committee's decision is questionable, for the lack of more
precise guidelines has led to problems. While the New Jersey apdecided that a given case shall not be submitted. By enacting such rules, the Supreme
Court has in my judgment unconstitutionally delegated to the district attorney the
exclusively judicial responsibility of sentencing.
Id.
59. 247 Pa. Super. at 129, 371 A.2d at 1360 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to Judge Spaeth:
Under Pa. R. Crim. P. 175-185, a district attorney's discretion is unfettered; thus
he is compelled to make arbitrary choices. His choices will always be arbitrary, no
matter how principled he may be, for with no objective standard to guide and restrain
him, they must be personal choices; and they may be arbitrary in a far more invidious
sense than that.The rules say that a district attorney "may" decide whether a "case"
should or should not be considered by the court for accelerated rehabilitative disposition. Pa. R. Crim. P. 175-76. What kind of "case?" The rules do not say. Having
decided-in whatever manner-upon the kind of case (forgeries, for example), how is
the district attorney to decide which case should and which case should not be considered by the court? What criteria is he to consider? What fact finding procedure is
he to follow to see if these criteria are met? The rules do not say.
Id. (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 130, 371 A.2d at 1361 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id.
62. Id. Quoting from Leonardis, 71 N.J. at 121, 363 A.2d at 340, the court noted that
before Leonardis, the practice in New Jersey was very similar to that of Pennsylvania, in
that no uniform definition of what cases should be considered for diversion existed. After
Leonardis, however, all defendants were eligible for diversion. 247 Pa. Super. at 130, 371
A.2d at 1361 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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proach may be too extensive, 6 ' it is at least a logical starting point.
The second requirement suggested by Judge Spaeth was a compilation of the various criteria applicable in determining whether a
certain case would be eligible for ARD treatment.6 5 Except for the
legislative proscription of offering ARD to certain DUI offenders, 6"
6 7
this proposition has not been addressed in Pennsylvania.
64. See, e.g., State v. White, 145 N.J. Super. 257, 367 A.2d 469, 471 (1976). In White, a
woman accused of murder applied for and, although eventually rejected, was given, by virtue of mandatory diversion guidelines, the opportunity to present any facts or materials
demonstrating amenability to the rehabilitative process. Id.
65. 247 Pa. Super. at 129, 371 A.2d at 1361 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
67. Cf., Cal. Penal Code § 1000(a)(1)-(6), N.J.R. Crim. P. 3:28. In contrast to the
Pennsylvania ARD program, both California and New Jersey provide for a list of criteria
that determine whether a specific crime is diversion-eligible. Under the Cal. Penal Code §
1000(a) (West Supp. 1985) the following criteria are to be used by the district attorney in
determining a defendant's eligibility for diversion:
(1) The defendant has no conviction for any offense involving controlled substances
prior to the alleged commission of the charged divertible offense.(2) The offense
charged did not involve a crime of violence or threatened violence.(3) There is no
evidence of a violation relating to narcotics or restricted dangerous drugs other than a
violation of the sections listed in this subdivision.(4) The defendant's record does not
indicate that probation or parole has ever been revoked without thereafter being
completed.(5) The defendant's record does not indicate that he has ever been diverted pursuant to this chapter within five years prior to the alleged commission of
the charged divertible offense.(6) The defendant has no prior felony conviction within
five years prior to the alleged commission of the charged divertible offense.
Id. § 1000(a)(1)-(6).
The New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 2C: 43-12(e)(1)-(17) (1982), lists the following criteria:
(e) Referral. At any time prior to trial but after the filing of a criminal complaint,
or the filing of an accusation or the return of an indictment, with the consent of the
prosecutor and upon written recommendation of the program director, the assignment judge or a judge designated by him may postpone all further proceedings
against an applicant and refer said applicant to a program supervisory treatment approved by the Supreme Court. Prosecutors and program directors shall consider in
formulating their recommendation of an applicant's participation in a supervisory
treatment program, among others, the following criteria:(1) The nature of the offense;(2) The facts of the case;(3) The motivation and age of the defendant;(4) The
desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution;(5) The existence of personal problems and character traits which may be related to the applicant's crime
and for which services are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which
may be provided more effectively through supervisory treatment and the probability
that the causes of criminal behavior can be controlled by proper treatment;(6) The
likelihood that the applicant's crime is related to a condition or situation that would
be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory treatment;(7) The
needs and interests of the victim and society;(8)The extent to which the applicant's
crime constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior;(9) The applicant's record of criminal and penal violations and the extent to which he may present
a substantial danger to others; (10) Whether or not the crime is of an assaultive or
violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or in the possible injurious conse-
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The third suggested requirement would create an orderly procedure by which satisfaction of the various criteria might be validated. Judge Spaeth relied on practices in California and New
Jersey which afforded rejected diversion candidates a written
statement of reasons for denying diversion. 8 Again in Pennsylvania, the district attorney of each county is left without guidance
from the rules as to the extent, if any, of his obligation to inform a
disappointed ARD applicant with the reasons for his rejection. 9
The fourth requirement was that there must be a hearing before
a judge who decides whether or not the defendant is acceptable for
diversion.70 Pennsylvania complies with the suggested requirement
only insofar as the district attorney decides to "move" a case for
ARD consideration. As Judge Spaeth indicated, however, there is
no requirement in the Rules that the judge give a statement of
reasons for acceptance or rejection of the defendant. 71 Despite his
stern criticism of ARD as it exists in Pennsylvania, Judge Spaeth
then concluded his dissent by indicating his strong belief in diversion as a humane and efficient form of criminal justice.72
In the concurring portion of his opinion, Judge Spaeth agreed
with the majority that Kindness' appeal should be rejected, but for
a vastly different reason. He believed, based upon his discussion of
quences of such behavior;(11) Consideration of whether or not prosecution would exacerbate the social problem that led to the applicant's criminal act;(12) The history of
the use of physical violence toward others;(13) Any involvement of the applicant with
organized crime;(14) Whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of
supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution;(15)
Whether or not the applicant's involvement with other people in the crime charged or
in other crime is such that the interest of the State would be best served by processing his case through traditional criminal justice system procedures;(16) Whether or
not applicant's participation in pretrial intervention will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants; and (17) Whether or not the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling
an offender into a supervisory treatment program.
Id.
68. 247 Pa.Super. at 130, 371 A.2d at 1361-62 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1000(b) (West 1970) (Supp. 1985), and Leonardis,
71 N.J. Super. at 115-19, 363 A.2d at 337-39).
69. See generally PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85 (1985). Indeed, the Pennsylvania ARD program provides only for notification if a defendant is accepted into the program. Rule 177 is
illustrative on this point. "When accelerated rehabilitative disposition proceedings are initiated, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall advise the defendant and his attorney of his
intention to present the case to an appropriate judge. Notice of the proceeding shall be sent
also to any victim or victims of the offense charged." Id.
70. 247 Pa. Super. at 130-31, 371 A.2d at 1362 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id.
72. Id.

1985

ARD

the four factors noted above, that the Pennsylvania program was
constitutionally infirm." In consideration thereof, perhaps the best
explanation for his lengthy dissent was his emphatic hope that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would take the steps necessary to
remedy the infirmities that he had attributed to the program.74
Judge Spaeth, who had so vehemently pressed the position that
the ARD program was riddled with constitutional infirmity, acknowledged in Commonwealth v. Joines," in perhaps a slip of the
pen, or resolved to the holding of Kindness, that, "[p]articipation
in an ARD program is conditioned on the district attorney's motion to the court that a defendant's case receive an accelerated dis7' 6
position; without that motion, a defendant will not qualify.
The constitutional issue of equal protection of the laws and
prosecutorial discretion was raised again, however, in Commonwealth v. Boerner,7 where the court relied on the holding in Kindness, and reviewed the wording of the Rules themselves in determining that the discretion to submit a case to ARD is vested in the
78
prosecutor.
The majority in Boerner quickly rejected the constitutional
claims raised by the appellant.79 Boerner had been charged with
DUI and was notified by the district attorney that his case would
be considered for ARD ° A hearing date was set, but before that
date, Boerner was again arrested for drunk driving. As a result, the
district attorney withdrew his case from consideration for the program and the scheduled hearing date was cancelled. Subsequently,
however, Boerner was acquitted of the second charge and sought,
but was refused, reconsideration for the ARD program.8 1 In the superior court, Boerner advanced a constitutionally based argument
that the district attorney's actions had denied him his equal protection of the laws and due process rights."2 In response, the supe73. Id.
74. Id. at 131, 371 A.2d at 1362 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Leonardis). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
75. 264 Pa. Super. 281, 399 A.2d 776 (1979) (trial court erred in not allowing defendant to cross-examine Commonwealth witness on that witness' withdrawal of his guilty plea
and placement into ARD program).
76. Id. at 285, 399 A.2d at 779.
77. 268 Pa. Super. 168, 407 A.2d 883 (1979).
78. Id. at 171-72, 407 A.2d at 885.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 170, 407 A.2d at 884-85.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 171, 407 A.2d at 885. The appellant also proffered a second argument in
which he alleged that the breathalyzer machine had not, at the time of his arrest, obtained
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rior court, relying on Kindness, stated that the ARD Rules themselves made it clear that it was wholly within the district attorney's
discretion to submit a person for ARD consideration, 83 and that
the intent of the Rules was to focus upon three participants: the
district attorney, the defendant, and the hearing judge, each hav84
ing a specific role.
The court, after affirming prosecutorial discretion in the area of
ARD generally, went on to specifically state that Boerner's equal
protection argument was erroneous because he had never been accepted into ARD; consequently, he had no right to demand reacceptance since he was not similarly situated with persons who had
been accepted into the program.8 5 Judge Spaeth authored a concurring and dissenting opinion unrelated to the constitutional issues discussed above.86 Nevertheless, in that opinion he placed a
footnote wherein he merely stated his view that the ARD program
is an unconstitutional delegation of power. He then directed the
87
reader to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Kindness.
In addition to Kindness and Boerner, another major case, Shade
v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation,88 addresses the
role of the prosecutor and the extent of his discretion in ARD matters. In Shade, the plaintiff requested that the district court declare unconstitutional the ARD program due to its alleged excessive grant of discretion in both the prosecuting attorney and the
county courts, and its discriminatory administration. 9
In responding to these assertions, the district court indicated
that ARD is essentially a quid pro quo, whereby the Commonwealth suspends formal criminal proceedings and the defendant reciprocates in some manner such as making restitution, participatthe necessary certification. The court noted that although it was error to have submitted the
breathalyzer results, it was harmless in view of other testimony concerning the appellant's
intoxication. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. According to the court, the district attorney, in his discretion, initiates the proceeding; the defendant must knowingly accept the conditions imposed by the district attorney; and, the hearing judge assesses the case and may grant the motion. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 173, 407 A.2d at 886 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 173, 407 A.2d at 886 (Spaeth, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. 394 F. Supp. 1237 (M.D. Pa. 1975). In Shade, both plaintiffs in 1974 pled guilty to
a DUI charge, received a $200 fine and six months probation, and had their licenses revoked
for one year. Id. In addition to their main constitutional argument, the plaintiffs also sought
a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin the Department of Transportation from
revoking their licenses, until such time as the ARD rules were applied equally to all Pennsylvania residents. Finally, the plaintiffs requested the reinstatement of their licenses. Id.
89. Id. at 1239.
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ing in a rehabilitation program, undergoing psychiatric treatment,
holding certain employment, or otherwise modifying his behavior.9 0
To reach this level, however, the court noted that a step-by-step
procedure is involved under the Rules, whereby the district attorney at his discretion may either sua sponte or upon defendant's
request submit the issue for ARD treatment or insist on prosecuting the defendant for the offense."
The district court, in dictum, also rejected the contention that
the ARD Rules are unconstitutional on their face because of the
alleged unfettered prosecutorial discretion in determining which
cases will receive ARD treatment.9 2 The court stated that such a
contention was "wholly without merit" and looked for support to
several decisions which recognized the exercise of discretion of the
prosecutor in analogous settings.9 3 One of those cases, Newman v.
United States,9" noted that few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than executive discretion in determining the institution,
charging and dismissal of criminal proceedings.9 5
Weighing even more strongly in favor of the notion that the
prosecutor possesses broad powers of discretion in ARD and may
exercise them in such a manner that, in the normal course, does
not violate equal protection safeguards, was the holding in the
90. Id. at 1240.
91. Id. (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 175 and 176).
92. 394 F. Supp. at 1240-41.
93. Id. Citing United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335 (U.S. App. D.C. 1972) (concept of prosecutorial discretion in charging is long standing and widely accepted, deriving
from the constitutional principle of separation of powers); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (although as a member of the bar the attorney for the United States
is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the government, and it is
as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not
there shall be a prosecution in a-particular case; thus it follows as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of
the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions).
94. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Although Newman preceded the institution of ARD
in Pennsylvania by several years, the issue involved therein was basically of the same nature. In Newman, the sole issue for decision was whether the appellant had suffered a denial
of his constitutional rights when the United States Attorney accepted appellant's co-defendant's guilty plea for a lesser offense while refusing to accept the same plea for appellant.
Id.
The Newman Court, per Burger, J., concluded that the identical treatment of every offender and every offense would be an impossible task. As the court stated: "Two persons
may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to charges." Id. at 481-82.
95. Id. at 480.
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United States Supreme Court case, Oyler v. Boles, 96 relied upon by
the Shade court.97 The Oyler Court stated that conscious selectivity is not necessarily violative of the constitution,9 8 and that while
statistics may indicate selective enforcement is occurring, equal
protection is not offended unless the selective enforcement is deliberately based upon an unjustifiably arbitrary classification standard such as race or religion. 9 Relying on these precedents, the
Shade court intimated that judicial review of prosecutorial discretion may occur only when such discretion evidences a deliberate
use of suspect and arbitrary classifications. In the absence thereof,
however, neither due process nor equal protection under the fourteenth amendment will have been violated. 10 0 Further, the Shade
court emphasized that ARD was merely one of several discretionary methods 0 1 for the disposition of criminal charges and that
ARD does not diminish the traditional power and discretion of the
prosecuting attorney to choose which crimes he wishes to
prosecute.10 2

In Pennsylvania, therefore, the prosecutor's ability to determine
which cases will be submitted for ARD treatment is well founded;
attacks on prosecutorial discretion in this area have been unsuccessful. Kindness, Boerner and Shade all establish this wide
breadth of prosecutorial discretion."0 3
Aside from the constitutionality of prosecutorial discretion, a
second major issue concerning ARD is the expungement of an ar96. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). Oyler involved the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute
that provided for a mandatory life sentence upon a third conviction of a crime punishable
by confinement in a penitentiary. Appellant and several others had each been three times
convicted of such crimes. Appellant, however, was the only party to receive a life sentence.
Appellant alleged, inter alia, that unless all persons in his situation were punished with a
life sentence, then the statute was being unconstitutionally applied. The Court disagreed.
The Court noted that the statistics did not establish that failure to seek the more severe
penalty was based upon race, religion or some other arbitrary classification. In light thereof,
then, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [on the part of the state
was] not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Id. at 449, 455-56.
97. 394 F. Supp. at 1242.
98. 368 U.S. at 456.
99. Id.
100. 394 F. Supp. at 1242.
101. Others listed by the Shade Court were nolle pros, whether or not to arrest, indict,
release, prosecute, dismiss, plea bargain or accept a guilty plea. Id.
102. Id. See also Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 45 Pa. Commw. 490, 407 A.2d 1364
(1979); Freed v. Commonwealth, 48 Pa. Commw. 178, 409 A.2d 1185 (1979) (automatic license revocation under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 616(a) following DUI conviction).
103. See also Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 495 Pa. 506, 434 A.2d 1205 (1981),
wherein the court stated: "Our rules give district attorneys broad discretion to select which
crimes and which individuals qualify for diversion into ARD." Id. at 512, 434 A.2d at 1208.
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rest record after the successful completion of the program. This
matter initially arose before the superior court in Commonwealth
v. Briley.' °4 Briley, a young college student, was one of many persons involved in a street corner celebration of the Philadelphia
Flyers Hockey Team's victory in the Stanley Cup finals.' °5 He was
subsequently arrested, held for court and charged with aggravated
assault upon a police officer, resisting arrest and failure of a disorderly person to disperse.'0 " He was admitted into the ARD program and satisfactorily completed the conditions imposed and
agreed upon.'0 7 Thereafter Briley filed a petition for expungement
of his record. This was opposed by the district attorney. The
charges were then dismissed but the court, after hearing, denied
the expungement request, and Briley appealed.' 8 The superior
court, per Judge Spaeth, writing for the near unanimous court,' 9
engaged in an extensive analysis involving an individual's substantive due process right, in certain circumstances, to have his arrest
record expunged."10 The superior court analyzed the expungement
issue under traditional criteria,"' and determined that Briley's circumstances presented a convincing case for expungement."2 The
court rejected the district attorney's argument that maintaining
the arrest record was necessary because ARD was designed for
first-time offenders and the Commonwealth, in the absence of the
record, would be unable to determine who would be eligible for
ARD. The court indicated that other administrative procedures
were available that would enable the Commonwealth to limit ARD
104. 278 Pa. Super. 363, 420 A.2d 582 (1980).
105. Id. at 365, 420 A.2d at 584.
106. Id., 420 A.2d at 584.
107. Id. at 366, 420 A.2d at 584. Briley served 18 months probation and paid a $200
fine. Id.
108. Id.
109. Judge Price wrote a brief dissent wherein he indicated his concern that while this
particular defendant evoked a sympathetic response from the court, this case would serve as
a forerunner of blanket expungement of criminal records. Id. at 374, 420 A.2d at 588 (Price,
J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 366, 420 A.2d at 584.
111. Id., 420 A.2d at 584. The court indicated that substantive due process requires a
balancing of the Commonwealth's interest in maintaining the arrest record against the defendant's interest in having his record expunged. According to the court, expungement
would occur if the harm against the defendant were unwarranted that justice would compel
no less. Id. at 366-67, 420 A.2d at 584-85.
See also Commonwealth v. Malone, 244 Pa. Super. 62, 366 A.2d 584 (1976); Commonwealth v. lancino, 270 Pa. Super. 350, 411 A.2d 754 (1979) (balancing test between state's
interest in retention and harm to individual that may result from retention).
112. 278 Pa. Super. at 370, 420 A.2d at 586.
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to first-time offenders.113
Briley, however, is interesting more for the attitude which the
court embraced. The court again explicitly recognized the district
attorney's discretion, 114 and his entrustment with the evaluation of
a defendant's suitability for ARD. Thus, with a view towards expungement, the court noted that the exercise of discretion demonstrated a belief on the part of the Commonwealth that the interests of society would be better served if the defendant were
speedily diverted out of the criminal justice system. 15
More importantly, however, the superior court noted that a person who enters the ARD program most likely believes, in light of
the consequent "dismissal" of the charges upon successful comple113. Id. at 371, 420 A.2d at 586. The court noted, as an example, that in Philadelphia
the court is required to keep a "monthly updated confidential list of completed expungements." Id.
114. Id. at 370, 420 A.2d at 586. Appellant was not tried because the district attorney
of Montgomery County, in the exercise of his discretion under PA. R. CraM. P. 176, believed
that appellant was a good candidate for placement in the ARD program and accordingly
moved the lower court for appellant's admission into the program. Id.
115. 278 Pa. Super. at 370, 420 A.2d at 586. To reach this determination, the court
relied on Commonwealth v. lancino, 270 Pa. Super. 350, 411 A.2d 754 (1979) (expungement
of defendant's record ordered where indictments for conspiracy and narcotics later nol
pros'd by district attorney), Commonwealth v. Rose, 263 Pa. Super. 349, 379 A.2d 1243
(1979) (expungement ordered where Commonwealth failed to establish defendant's guilt of
retail theft before district magistrate), and Wert v. Jennings, 249 Pa. Super. 467, 378 A.2d
390 (1977) (due process requires compelling evidence to justify retention of arrest record
where defendant's indictment by grand jury for perjury and conspiracy eventually nol
pros'd by district attorney for lack of evidence). The court noted that while recommendation for ARD treatment is not the equivalent to an acquittal, the practical effect was the
same. That is, under both sets of circumstances (acquittal/nolle prosse and ARD) the Commonwealth would be forever barred from convicting the defendant on the initial charges
against him. Moreover, in all of these circumstances, it had been the district attorney's actions that resulted in either acquittal, nolle prosse, or ARD treatment. 278 Pa. Super. at
369, 420 A.2d at 586. The court then noted that in light of its holdings in Iacino, Rose, and
Wert, the burden was upon the Commonwealth to justify the retention of defendant's arrest
record after the successful completion of ARD. Id. at 370, 420 A.2d at 586.
The Briley court distinguished Commonwealth v. Mueller, 258 Pa.-Super. 219, 392 A.2d
763 (1978), wherein the Commonwealth had made out a prima facie case against the accused, only to have the charges dropped when the accused secured his release pursuant to
PA. R. CRiM. P. 1100. According to the Briley court, the Mueller court had placed the burden
of expungement upon the accused because of its conclusion that the defendant's interest in
having his arrest record expunged was far outweighed by the:
Commonwealth's interest in retaining the arrest record of a person whom it believed should have been prosecuted and convicted, whose guilt was indicated by evidence produced at the preliminary hearing, and who was not tried only because of his
reliance upon a technical rule that in no way bore upon his guilt or innocence of the
charges against him.
Id. at 370-71, 420 A.2d at 585.
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tion of the program, that he would have a "clean" record. 110 Maintaining the arrest record, in the court's opinion, would be misleading in light of the explicit, or implicit, indication that a clean
record might be obtained." 7 Further, the court indicated that the
district attorney's opposition to expungement after a person successfully completes the program fosters a bitterness on the part of
the person, as well as providing a strong motivation for persons to
pursue acquittal at trial rather than diversion. The court indicated
that such a situation would encompass the disappointment of "legitimate" expectations, and would undermine the purpose and
goals of the ARD program; thus the court ordered that Briley's
record be expunged."'
The view of the Briley court was relied upon less than a month
later in Commonwealth v. Welford," 9 where the appellant, a
twenty-year-old college student, was arrested for drunk driving.12
Welford successfully completed the program, graduated from college and successfully petitioned the lower court to direct expungement of his criminal record. 2 The district attorney of Montgomery County appealed, asserting, as the court phrased it, "only its
general policy of opposing expunction in all cases wherein the accused was discharged for reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence
. . . [and] a general interest in maintaining accurate records regarding those accused of crime ... "22 The court determined
that such an interest was not persuasive, finding that retention of
the record would hamper Welford in securing future employment
and that this interest demanded expungement in this factual
23
setting.1
With that background, it was a year later in Commonwealth v.
Armstrong124 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced the ex116. Id. at 373, 420 A.2d at 588.
117. Id. at 373 n.6, 420 A.2d at 588 n.6. The letter initially sent to a defendant concerning ARD, explicitly offered the defendant the possibility of obtaining a "clean record."

Id.
118. Id. at 373-74, 420 A.2d at 588. The court also restated the purpose of ARD as it
applied to this defendant, "The ARD program was created, in large part, to keep persons
such as this high-spirited college student out of the criminal justice system, to rehabilitate
those who are generally law-abiding, and to protect them from lasting damage because of an
isolated, relatively minor infraction of the law." Id.
119. 279 Pa. Super. 300, 420 A.2d 1344 (1980).
120. Id. at 302, 420 A.2d at 1344.
121. Id., 420 A.2d at 1344.
122. Id. at 303, 420 A.2d at 1345.
123. Id., 420 A.2d at 1345.
124. 495 Pa. 506, 434 A.2d 1205 (1981). As with Briley, the issue was whether the
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act circumstance pointed to in Briley. Armstrong was arrested for
and charged with theft by deception and was selected, as a firsttime offender, to participate in the Bucks County ARD program.
She successfully completed the program and the charge was dismissed. 12 5 Armstrong then petitioned to have her arrest record expunged. A hearing was held on that petition and the trial court
denied the petition."" After a grant of allocatur, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted that the Commonwealth had failed to present any evidence at the expungement hearing. The court then
looked closely at Armstrong's situation to determine whether expungement should have been granted. 2 7 According to the court,
the appellant's factual circumstances indicated thatabsent an overriding state interest, expungement should have followed her successful completion of the ARD program. Armstrong, at the time of
her expungement petition, was employed as a part-time file clerk
earning eighty-five dollars bi-weekly. 2 8 She was, however, "first in
line" for a full-time position that would have more than tripled her
salary. But, as a pre-requisite for the position, it was necessary
that Armstrong be "bonded;" something that her arrest record prevented. 2 9 The supreme court then examined the interests of the
Commonwealth in maintaining her records. The court noted that
while the private interests of the bonding company might justify
retention of the arrest record, the Commonwealth had failed to advance any state interest to override the private interests involved.
Thus, Armstrong's specific interest in clearing her record was held
to be more substantial.' 30 The supreme court pointed to the language of the Comment to Rule 185 which then included the
appellant's record should have been expunged after successful completion of ARD. Id.
125. Id. at 508, 434 A.2d at 1206.
126. Id., 434 A.2d at 1205.
127. Id. at 508, 434 A.2d at 1206. The court began its discussion by reaffirming its
previous holding in Commonwealth v. Wexler, 494 Pa. 325, 431 A.2d 877 (1981), "that in
certain circumstances substantive due process guarantees an individual the right to have his
or her arrest record expunged." Id. at 329, 431 A.2d at 879. The court also stated that the
right to petition for expungement need not be statutorily created, but rather is a corollary to
due process. 495 Pa. at 509, 434 A.2d at 1206 (citing Wolfe v. Beal, 477 Pa. 477, 384 A.2d
1187 (1978)).
128. 495 Pa. at 509, 434 A.2d at 1206.
129. Id. at 511, 434 A.2d at 1207.
130. Id. at 512, 434 A.2d at 1208. The court, citing Commonwealth v. Wexler, 494 Pa.
325, 431 A.2d 877 (1981), noted that several factors that should be considered in determining the various interests include the strength of the Commonwealth's case, its reasons for
wishing to retain the records, defendant's age, criminal record, employment history, elapsed
time between arrest and expungement petition, and specific adverse consequences to defendant. 495 Pa. at 510, 434 A.2d at 1207.
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phrase, "earn a clean record,"1 3' and noted that the fundamental
appeal of ARD is the avoidance of a criminal record.' 3 1 Justice
Kauffman, writing for the court, stated that the denial of expungement for successful ARD participants would unduly deter participation, undermine the rehabilitative purposes, and impose added
strain on the judicial system.' 33 Thus, the supreme court reiterated
the notion, stated both in Briley"" and Welford,'3 5 that the Commonwealth has the burden of justifying the retention of the arrest
record. In Armstrong's instance, the court stated that the Commonwealth's failure to identify any law enforcement need to retain
her arrest record, in conjunction with the inherent policy of ARD
of offering first offenders a new start, compelled expungement as
requested. 13
Despite the defeat in terms of expungement, however, the district attorney emerged with the clear recognition from the supreme
court, itself the author and source of ARD, that the "rules give
district attorneys broad discretion to select which crimes and
1 7
which individuals qualify for diversion into ARD.' 1
Nevertheless, some indication that the courts should or would
exercise some restraint on the prosecutor's discretion appeared in
Commonwealth v. Hunter.'3' The defendant was charged with several criminal offenses, including burglary, receiving stolen property
and criminal conspiracy. The district attorney of Mercer County
motioned the trial court for ARD, but the trial court, after hearing
the facts of the case, denied the motion.' 39 On appeal, the superior
court relying on Rule 184(c),' 40 quashed the defendant's appeal as
131. Id. at 512, 434 A.2d at 1208.
132. Id., 434 A.2d at 1208.
133. Id. at 512-13, 434 A.2d at 1208.
134. Commonwealth v. Briley, 278 Pa. Super. 363, 420 A.2d 582 (1980).
135. Commonwealth v. Welford, 279 Pa. Super. 300, 420 A.2d 1344 (1980).
136. 495 Pa. at 513, 434 A.2d at 1208.
137. Id. at 512, 434 A.2d at 1208 (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-77, quoting Briley; see
supra, text accompanying note 115). See also Pyle v. Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, 494 Pa. 323, 431 A.2d 876 (1981), wherein the court rejected appellants' equal
protection claim based on the Cumberland County prosecutor's refusal to accept any cases
for ARD. In a summary dismissal, the court stated; "our review of the record and of the
applicable authorities .
convinces us that the petitioner's claims are without merit." Id.
at 325, 431 A.2d at 877.
138. 294 Pa. Super. 52, 439 A.2d 745 (1982).
139. Id. at 53-54, 439 A.2d at 746.
140. PA. R. CRIM. P. 184(c), prohibits an appeal from an order terminating ARD when
a defendant violates the conditions of the ARD program/probation. It provides:
When the defendant is brought before the Court, the judge shall afford him an
opportunity to be heard. If the judge finds that the defendant has committed a viola-
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interlocutory and unappealable. 14 1 The Hunter court made it clear

that a court's specified power pursuant to Rule

179142

allowed the

lower court to veto what it believed to be inappropriate cases for
143

ARD.

Rule 179(c) certainly provides for the supervisory role of the
court in terms of rejecting cases submitted by the district attorney
for ARD consideration. Further, the comment following Rule 185
establishes this supervisory role: "It is believed that the district
attorney should have discretion with respect to which crimes he
wishes to prosecute, and the presence of the judge in the program,
along with the defendant and his attorney, precludes any danger
14
that such discretion may be abused." '
The only time the appellate courts have indicated that the court
itself may order diversion over the prosecution's objection occurred
in an extraordinary and unique factual circumstance. In Commonwealth v. McSorley, 115 the defendant was arrested and charged
tion of a condition of the program, he may order, when appropriate, that the program
be terminated, and that the attorney for the Commonwealth shall proceed on the
charges as provided by law. No appeal shall be allowed from such an order.
Id.
141. 294 Pa. Super. at 57, 439 A.2d at 747.
142. PA. R. CRIM. P. 179 (1985). Rule 179 states:
Hearing, Manner of Proceeding
(a) When the defendant, with the advice and agreement of his attorney, indicates
his understanding of these proceedings, requests that he be accepted into the program, and agrees to the procedure set forth in Rule 178, the stenographer shall close
the record.
(b) The judge thereupon shall hear the facts of the case as presented by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and such information as the defendant or his attorney
may present, and shall hear from any victim present; but no statement presented by
the defendant shall be used against him for any purpose in any criminal or civil
proceeding.
(c) After hearing the facts of the case, if the judge believes that it warrants accelerated rehabilitative disposition, he shall order the stenographer to reopen the record
and he shall state to the parties the condition of the program.
(d) The defendant shall thereupon state to the judge whether he accepts the conditions and agrees to comply. If his statement is in the affirmative, the judge may grant
the motion for accelerated rehabilitative disposition and shall enter an appropriate
order as set forth in Rules 180 or 181. If the defendant answers in the negative, the
judge shall proceed as set forth in Rule 184(c).
Id.
143. 294 Pa. Super. at 55, 439 A.2d at 747. The court further stated that "when, in
exercising his discretion pursuant to PA. R. CRiM. P. 179(c), if the judge does not believe that
the case warrants accelerated rehabilitative disposition, the proper and mandated procedural step is for the attorney for the Commonwealth to proceed on the charges as provided
by law." Id.
144. PA. R. CRIM. P. 185, comment.
145. 335 Pa. Super. 522, 485 A.2d 15 (1984).
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with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 46 After arraignment, McSorley received a letter, under the letterhead of the district attorney's ARD/DUI division, from the director of the program which operated a safe driving clinic for
Montgomery County. The letter provided, inter alia, that McSorley was: to attend a safe driving clinic, to report to the Montgomery County Court House on four specific dates and times for classes and interviews, and to pay a fifty dollar fee for the interview
and classes. 147 A week later, defendant McSorley received a letter
from the chief of the ARD division of the district attorney's office
which gave McSorley a general description of the ARD alternative,
and instructed him to complete an enclosed questionnaire used to
determine his eligibility for ARD. The letter was to be returned
within ten days.1 4 8 McSorley completed the questionnaire, returned it on the night of his first safe driving class, attended the
four classes over the course of the ensuing month, and, after the
last class, received a certificate signed by the director, who had
sent him the original letter, stating that he had successfully completed the requirements of the clinic.14
Three days later, appellant was apprised by letter that he had
been ineligible for ARD due to two minor arrests in Philadelphia
County.' 50 At trial, appellant asserted that the Commonwealth's
acts were tantamount to double jeopardy, and that therefore the
charges should be dismissed." 1
The trial court determined that McSorley had neither been put
in prior jeopardy nor suffered any punishment from ARD or any
criminal penalty, and that there was no valid evidence that McSorley had been accepted into the ARD program.1 5 s The trial court
then denied the motion. 5 ' On appeal, the superior court issued an
"Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court," indicating that
while a majority agreed with the judgment, which remanded the
146. Id. at 524, 485 A.2d at 16-17.
147. 335 Pa. Super. at 524-25, 485 A.2d at 17.
148. Id. at 525, 485 A.2d at 17.
149. Id., 485 A.2d at 17.
150. Id., 485 A.2d at 17-18.
151. Id. at 526, 485 A.2d at 17-18. Appellant McSorley raised a double jeopardy issue
which centered around his payment of the fifty dollar fee for ARD. He asserted that the
payment and subsequent attendance constituted a restriction upon his freedom, thus a deprivation of his liberty. Consequently, a trial on the merits would be an impermissible act.
The Commonwealth maintained that appellant's participation had been voluntary, whereby
he had never been subjected to punishment for his activities. Id.
152. Id. at 528, 485 A.2d at 18.
153. Id. at 524, 485 A.2d at 16.
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case with directions to divert McSorley into ARD, the panel did
not join in the opinion. 15 The court recognized that while the record established that the district attorney's office had never intended to recommend McSorley for ARD, an undiscovered administrative error originally led the district attorney to inform the
clinic that McSorley had been accepted into the ARD program and
led the clinic to send the initial letter. 155 Despite this apparent
mistake on the part of the Commonwealth that McSorley would be
eligible for the ARD program, the court rejected his request for
dismissal based on double jeopardy.56 The court noted that this
was a case of first impression in the Commonwealth, whereby the
case law was unclear as to how ARD would affect the status of a
1 57
criminal defendant.
The court did indicate, however, that while acceptance of ARD
constituted a knowing waiver by the defendant to prove his innocence,1 58 and was not the equivalent of finding of innocence, 59 it
had also been determined that ARD acceptance was neither the
equivalent of a conviction because charges were deferred' 60 nor a
conviction for impeachment purposes. 6 1
With that in mind, the court intimated that its initial inclination
was to dismiss the defendant's double jeopardy claim, as jeopardy
had not yet attached.6 2 Notwithstanding the above, however, the
court sought guidance from without the jurisdiction, to reach its
154. Id. at 524 n.1, 531, 485 A.2d at 16 n.1., 20. The panel consisted of Judges Cavanaugh, McEwen, and Cirillo. Judge Cirillo concurred in a separate opinion; Judge McEwen
dissented and also filed an opinion. Id. at 531-33, 485 A.2d at 20-21. The superior court's
opinion stated that the record indicated that McSorley: (1) interpreted the original letter as
directing him to report to the Montgomery County ARD program; (2) attended the safe
driving classes, believing that he was in ARD; (3) believed that the successful completion of
the classes would result in dismissal of the charges against him; (4)before each of the four
sessions at the court house, wrote down "ARD" on the visitor's log as the nature of his
business; and (5) did not consult with a lawyer during any part of the proceedings until
after the final letter which rejected him for ARD. Id. at 525-26, 485 A.2d at 17.
155. Id. at 525-26, 485 A.2d at 17.
156. Id. at 526-27, 485 A.2d at 20.
157. Id. at 527, 485 A.2d at 18.
158. Id., 485 A.2d at 18.
159. Id. at 527-28, 485 A.2d at 18.
160. Id. at 527, 485 A.2d at 18.
161. Id., 485 A.2d at 18.
162. Id. at 528, 485 A.2d at 18. See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (jeopardy
attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651
(1977) (double jeopardy protects a defendant from multiple punishments for successive
prosecutions of the same offense); Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, 486 Pa. 241, 405 A.2d 881
(1979) (in non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court has begun to hear the evidence).
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conclusion. Relying upon an Ohio Court of Appeals decision, 6 3 the
court likened the defendant's participation in ARD to a contract
between the defendant and the state, whereby in consideration for
the defendant's waiver of any statute of limitations, speedy trial
rights, and any conditions, the state agrees to dismiss the charges
against the defendant."" The court concluded that in order to
maintain the efficacy of an ARD program, the state must honor its
obligation to the defendant. 6 5
Turning to McSorley's circumstances, the court stated that while
the procedures outlined in the ARD Rules were not followed,
McSorley, and any other reasonable person under similar circumstances, would not have acted differently.1 66 The court emphasized
that McSorley had detrimentally relied on the indication from the
district attorney's office that the "successful completion of the pro16 7
gram would result in a dismissal of the charges against him.
163. 335 Pa. Super. at 528, 485 A.2d at 18-19. The court relied upon State v. Urvan, 4
Ohio App. 3d 151, 446 N.E.2d 1161 (1982). In Urvan, the defendant was charged with receiving stolen property in Medina County, Ohio under an allied offense statute with receiving stolen property. The defendant was recommended for and successfully completed the
diversion program in Medina County. As a result, the receiving charge was dismissed. One
week later, the defendant was indicted in Cuyahoga County for grand theft relating to the
same events as the Medina County charge. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
Cuyahoga charge on grounds of double jeopardy. The Urvan court pointed out that:
Any view of diversion processes not at war with their purposes must include a conception of them (when successfully completed) as the equivalent of served or probated time with the consequent expiation of the crime . . . . Moreover, if the program is to make logical sense and traffic at all in fair treatment, the states's election
to pursue the crime of stolen property forecloses its right to undertake pursuit of the
grand theft charge through a second agent (Cuyahoga County). Jeopardy must attach
as a result of the activity of the first (Medina County).
Id.
164. 335 Pa. Super. at 529, 485 A.2d at 19. The court then stated that diversion programs are similar to plea bargaining, in that in both instances the terms of the agreement
are, and must be binding upon the state. Id., 485 A.2d at 19. Further, while the court reaffirmed the broad discretion of the prosecution in determining whether a case should be
given ARD treatment, "the decision to divert ...
'comes after the prosecutor has fully discharged all discretionary functions and after the prosecutorial die has been cast.'" Id., 485
A.2d at 19 (quoting Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn. 1980)).
The court seemingly adopted the Urvan court's elucidation regarding the double jeopardy
issue. "For the state to be allowed to ...
bring a second prosecution . . . after all of the
terms of the diversion contract have been met, violates the spirit and the letter of constitutional double jeopardy policy and the policy and the spirit of the legislative policy in the
state." 335 Pa. Super. at 529, 485 A.2d at 19 (quoting Urvan, 4 Ohio App. 3d at 155, 446
N.E.2d at 1168).
165. 335 Pa. Super. at 529, 485 A.2d at 19.
166. Id. at 530-31, 485 A.2d at 19-20.
167. Id. at 530, 485 A.2d at 20. The court indicated: "what the district attorney's office
knew and did with its right hand (sending the notification that appellant could reasonably
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However, although the court determined that the district attorney
was restrained from prosecuting McSorley, the court concluded
The court therefore
that dismissal would be inappropriate. 1
stayed the proceedings and remanded with directions to divert
McSorley into ARD and to impose upon McSorley any remaining
conditions that would be placed upon a similarly situated
defendant."1 9
Judge Cirillo concurred in the result, but disagreed with the interjection of double jeopardy principles, which he felt were inapplicable to resolve the issue. Rather, Judge Cirillo found the concept
of contract between the state and the defendant as compelling and
that the state had plainly breached its agreement.17 0
Judge McEwen dissented, stating his belief that jeopardy had
never attached and that the principles of contract law and fairness
did not preclude prosecution, since the correspondence from the
district attorney stated that his application would have to be evaluated and the accused would be notified of his acceptance or rejection."
Judge McEwen indicated that McSorley was notified
twenty-five days after his application was submitted and that the
only hardship he suffered was the attendance at the four classes
and fifty dollar fee paid. Judge McEwen stated that while under
certain circumstances fairness might preclude prosecution, this was
1 72
not one of those occasions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The concerns originally voiced by Judge Spaeth in Kindness
have essentially gone unaddressed and thus leave intact the broad
discretion of the prosecutor in ARD matters. 173 However, the cases
following Kindness not only call attention to the problems of such
wide prosecutorial discretion but also raise other constitutional
have interpreted as evidencing his acceptance into ARD), it cannot take away with its left
hand (by claiming that appellant was ineligible)." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 531-33, 485 A.2d at 20-21 (Cirillo, J., concurring). Judge Cirillo stated: "A
criminal defendant has a 'constitutional interest in finality, a cognizable interest in seeing
that criminal proceedings against him are resolved once and for all.' . . . Here however,
appellant has no right to expect that his problems with the Commonwealth have been resolved. His constitutional interest in finality has not yet vested." Id., (Cirillo, J., concurring)
(quoting Western & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT.
REV. 81).
171. 335 Pa. Super. at 533-36, 485 A.2d at 21-23 (McEwen, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (McEwen, J., dissenting).
173. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
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questions that will have to be addressed by our appellate courts.
Until such direction or guidance is forthcoming, the apparently unbridled discretion of the prosecutor will be operative.
Presently, although the exercise of that discretion has given rise
to problems, the appellate courts have generally honored or at
least given effect to the relatively unfettered discretion exercised
by the district attorney in ARD matters. Not only have the courts
recognized that discretion in and of itself, but they have defended
it against constitutional attack on both equal protection and due
process grounds.
Perhaps the courts have implicitly recognized the immense value
of the ARD program in providing disposition of an enormous number of criminal charges through a non-traditional but highly efficient process that benefits the court system and defendants. Since
that process is highly successful in both instances, the court is perhaps reluctant to disrupt the current status of the program by accepting finely tuned constitutional arguments.
That the problems in regard to ARD have become widespread is
evidenced by the case of Commonwealth v. Lutz, 17 4 where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have finally laid to rest any realistic hopes that the prosecutor's discretion in this area may be successfully challenged. In Lutz, nine individual cases were consolidated for determination since each raised the question of whether
a defendant may be admitted to ARD over objection of the prosecutor. 171 In seven of the cases, the trial court ordered that each
defendant be considered for ARD, and in two others the trial court
actually ordered that the defendants be admitted to ARD over the
objection of the prosecutor.17 All of the cases were drunk driving
cases being prosecuted under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code.17 7 Nevertheless, the supreme court chose to speak very
broadly in terms of the prosecutor's discretion regarding ARD, and
there can be no doubt that prosecutors received an early Christmas
gift from the supreme court.
Justice Flaherty, writing for a near unanimous court,17 8 briefly
outlined the history of and theory behind ARD, making explicit
reference to the fact that the utilization of ARD was at the option
174. Pa.
, 495 A.2d 928 (1985).
175. Id. at __, 495 A.2d at 930.
176. Id.
177. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
178. Pa. -,
495 A.2d at 930. Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice Zappala, authored a concurring and dissenting opinion. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
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of the district attorney. 1 9 The court then addressed the more narrow issue of whether it was properly within the prosecutor's discretion to refuse, if so inclined, any one case under the ARD rules
despite the Motor Vehicle Code provision that ARD be available
statewide for drunk drivers. 8 0 However, within that context, the
court, perhaps sensing the need for clarity or a more definitive
standard in the area, undertook a broader discussion of the prosecutor's discretion in ARD matters. 81 First, Justice Flaherty, citing
Rules 175-85,182 dispelled the proposition given effect by the trial
courts in these cases that anyone other than the district attorney
may move for the admission of a defendant into ARD. 83 The majority emphasized that the ARD rules preserved the traditional
discretion afforded the prosecutor in choosing which crimes he
wished to prosecute,"8 and the court clearly stated that a defendant was precluded from submitting his own case for ARD consideration." 5 Justice Flaherty noted further that the court, by its own
design, intentionally preferred a restrictive approach to the admission to ARD programs. The court also emphasized that the district
attorney, as representative of the Commonwealth, is responsible to
ensure that no criminal defendant enter the ARD program whose
case is inappropriate for such a disposition.18 6 As the court stated:
"Society has no interest in blindly maximizing the number of
ARD's passing through the criminal justice system, and the criminal defendant has no right to demand that he be placed on ARD
merely because any particular offense is his first.' 8 7 Later in the
opinion, Justice Flaherty again unequivocally laid to rest any notion that anyone other than the prosecutor may move for a defendant to be placed on ARD: "Our earlier discussion of the Pyle and
Boerner cases and a plain reading of our ARD rules, Pa. R. Crim.
P. 175-185, themselves make it clear that only Commonwealth attorneys may move for admission to ARD under those rules."' 8 8
The court, in perhaps the most important part of the Lutz opin179. Pa. at -, 495 A.2d at 931.
180. Id. at -, 495 A.2d at 931-32. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
181. Pa. at -, 495 A.2d at 932.
182. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85. See supra note 24.
183. Pa. at -, 495 A.2d at 932.
184. Id., (quoting PA. R. CRIM. P. 185, comment).
185. Id., 495 A.2d at 933 (citing Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 495 Pa. 506, 512, 434
A.2d 1205, 1208 (1981)) (admission to ARD is not a matter of right, but a privilege).
186. Pa. at -,
495 A.2d at 933.
187. Id.
188. Id., 495 A.2d at 935.
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ion, set out the standard of review under which a prosecutor's decision to withhold a case from diversion is scrutinized. As stated,
that standard allows the prosecution to exercise the widest available discretion under the law:
[T]he decision to submit the case for ARD rests in the sound discretion of
the district attorney, and absent an abuse of that discretion involving some
criteria for admission to ARD wholly, patently and without doubt unrelated
to the protection of society and/or the likelihood of a person's success in
rehabilitation, such as race, religion or other such obviously prohibited considerations, the attorney for the Commonwealth must be free to submit a
case or not submit it for ARD consideration based on his view of what is
beneficial for society and the offender.' 9

There can be no doubt that this ultimately is the most important part of the Lutz opinion, for it now encumbers a defendant
with the difficult if not insurmountable burden of pleading and
demonstrating that the prosecutor's decision not to submit his case
for ARD consideration is one dispossessed of rationality.1 9 The
Lutz court vacated the orders in all the cases and remanded the
cases for trial, realistically ending whatever speculation remained
that the prosecutor is restrained in administering the ARD program absent the most flagrant abuse of discretion.1 9
Chief Justice Nix, joined by Mr. Justice Zappala, wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, wherein he agreed that the prosecutor
should have sole discretion in determining which cases should be
submitted for ARD.192 However, the Chief Justice concisely noted
two concerns, echoing those first recognized by the dissenting
Judge Spaeth in Kindness.1 93 First Chief Justice Nix was troubled
by the fact that there was no requirement in the ARD rules or
applicable case law that the prosecutor specifically articulate the
reasons for withholding any one case from ARD disposition.194 Justice Nix believed that a mandated articulation was a necessary
measure to guard against an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Sec189.

Id. at

-

(emphasis in original) (citing Shade v. Commonwealth, Dept. of

Transp., 394 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975)).
190. See generally, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) wherein the Court noted
that under the rational basis test, state action is valid unless the heavy burden is met that
the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of

any combination of legitimate purposes, that a court can only conclude that the government's actions were irrational.
191.

__

Pa. at

__,

495 A.2d at 936.

192. Id.
193. Id. See also supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
194.

__

Pa.at

__,

495 A.2d at 936-37.
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ond, the dissenting Chief Justice disagreed with the standard of
review established by the majority. Rather than granting the prosecutor the widest possible discretion afforded under the law as the
Lutz majority had done, Chief Justice Nix stated that an abuse of
discretion should be found upon a showing of fraud or
arbitrariness. 195
Although unfettered, unrestrained or absolute are not wholly accurate terms to describe the discretion of the prosecutor in regard
to ARD, it is now clear that both by design, and perhaps necessity,
the prosecutor is granted the widest possible discretion under the
law in order to effectively administer a program that is of immense
benefit to the court, the prosecutor and the thousands of persons
who avoid traditional prosecution for lesser offenses by entering
the ARD program.
While there are still areas of ARD that lend themselves to criticism (e.g., the lack of uniform statewide standards as to what offenses should be included for diversion), the wide discretion given
to the prosecutor enjoys the continued and perhaps enhanced support of the court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Committee. Opportunities to curtail the prosecutor's broad prerogative
have continuously presented themselves to the courts and the
Rules Committee. Nonetheless, owing in part to the program's success and in part to the flexibility so necessary to effectively implement and assure the success of ARD, the support of the prosecution's wide discretion in selecting ARD participants, in contrast to
its more limited ability to deny expungement, has remained the
strongest from the very sources of change. The Pennyslvania Supreme Court's decision in Lutz, in particular, represents a desirable clarification of the parameters of this exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. While this decision leaves little doubt that ARD is
firmly established as part of, or at least an extension of the prosecutor's charging function, it remains to be seen which challenges
will prevail in those areas where Pennsylvania's ARD program remains vulnerable.
Edward J. Borkowski

195. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Burdge, No. J-35035, slip op. at 2-4 (Pa. Super.
Sept. 6, 1985) (superior court relying on Lutz rejected court established admission criteria
for ARD, stating, "Because ARD is a pre-trial disposition, its governance lies at the discretion of the district attorney, not that of the court." Id. at 3).

